The Digital Dependence Index is an invaluable resource due to its global coverage and its 14 years of nuanced data. Check out media mentions and related publications here.

Digital Patent Decline. The Economic and Political Costs of Europe’s Shrinking ICT Patent Share

Europe’s digital innovation is declining because European firms lag behind the US and East Asia in creating ICT patents and digital intellectual property. This growing dependence on foreign IP weakens Europe’s competitiveness, political influence, and digital sovereignty, making urgent action necessary. Europe should address its ICT patent gap by systematically incentivizing European patenting and increasing research that turns scientific knowledge into commercial opportunities. In the short to medium term, Europe should strategically manage its dependence on foreign IP by choosing reliable partners and ensuring continued access to essential digital technologies.

• Authors: Laura Mahrenbach, Rogelio Madrueño, Yen-Chi Lu, Maximilian Mayer
• Source: Vodafone Institute and CASSIS/University of Bonn.
• Publication date: 2026-07-15
• Language: English

Europas Anteil an Digitalpatenten fällt unter fünf Prozent

Europe’s share of globally granted ICT patents fell below 5% in 2023, while China accounted for more than half. Between 2000 and 2023, the EU held just 7% of ICT patents, compared with China’s 39% and the US’s 24%. This dependence on foreign intellectual property threatens Europe’s economic resilience and digital sovereignty. The EU is particularly weak in semiconductors, digital communications, and computer technologies. The report calls for stronger patent-focused innovation policies, greater investment in research, infrastructure, and skilled workers, closer industry–science cooperation, and strategic partnerships with countries such as Japan and South Korea.

• Authors: Miriam Dahlinger, Laurenz Gehrke, Gabriel Rinaldi, Charlotte Westphal
• Source: Süddeutsche Zeitung Dossier
• Publication date: 2026-07-14
• Language: German

Digital-Patente: Europa liegt zurück und verliert an Souveränität

Europe’s digital sovereignty is weakened by its shortage of information and communications technology (ICT) patents. The EU accounted for less than 5% of global ICT patents in 2023, while China held more than half. This leaves Europe reliant on foreign intellectual property, costs it more in licensing fees than it earns, and reduces its influence over global technology standards. The researchers argue that deregulation alone will not fix this weakness. They recommend stronger incentives for European ICT patents, better-coordinated research and development investment, and closer partnerships with technologically advanced countries such as Japan and South Korea.

• Authors: Corinna Visser
• Source: table.media
• Publication date: 2026-07-14
• Language: German

Industriepolitik: Europas stille Digitalschwäche

Europe’s digital weakness goes beyond regulation: it produces too few information and communications technology (ICT) patents. The EU accounted for less than 5% of global ICT patents in 2023 and 7% cumulatively from 2000 to 2023, while China held more than half in 2023. This leaves Europe paying more in licence fees than it earns—$138 billion more in 2024—and vulnerable to foreign influence over technology standards and supply chains. The report links China’s rise partly to sustained industrial policies and warns that patent ownership can become geopolitical leverage. It recommends stronger incentives for ICT patents, better coordinated research and development investment, and partnerships with patent-leading countries such as Japan and South Korea. Europe’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act may help, but the authors question whether it is sufficient on its own.

• Authors: Lisa Oder
• Source: Tagesspiegel
• Publication date: 2026-07-14
• Language: German

Europe’s Digital Decade Is in Disarray

Under the banner of the European Union’s Digital Decade agenda, Europe is investing in digitalization to protect its industries from shocks and to strengthen digital skills, businesses, and connectivity. Still, much of Europe’s tech value and manufacturing depend on close ties to US Big Tech and heavy reliance on Chinese digital imports. Instead of reactive policies, the EU should focus on a consistent and systematic industrial approach, develop a more strategic and proactive trade policy, increase investment in infrastructure and reverse negative net capital formation to foster innovation, and move on to a narrative of collaboration and resilience through partnership.

Thierry Monasse/Getty Images

• Authors: Laura Mahrenbach, Maximilian Mayer
• Source: Project Syndicate
• Publication date: 2026-04-17
• Language: English

Europas digitale Abhängigkeit ist größer als gedacht – und sie kostet Milliarden

Europe’s digital trade surplus may overstate its independence. Ireland accounted for 87.2% of the EU’s cumulative surplus in digital services from 2020 to 2024, largely because US tech companies report European business there. Excluding Ireland, the EU ran a $350.1 billion deficit in digital goods and services from 2022 to 2024. Europe is also heavily dependent on China for digital hardware. China accounted for 76% of the EU’s ICT-goods trade deficit from 2020 to 2023, and the deficit reached $143.4 billion in 2024. These dependencies leave European businesses and governments vulnerable to supply disruptions and geopolitical tensions. The report calls for stronger European manufacturing and competitiveness, reduced reliance on Chinese goods, and technology partnerships to build resilience and shared digital autonomy.

• Authors: Eva Schmitt
• Source: Merkur
• Publication date: 2026-04-01
• Language: German

Digitales Handelsdefizit - Europas versteckte digitale Abhängigkeit

Europe’s digital trade surplus is misleading: US tech companies operating from Ireland distort the statistics, and without them the EU would have a digital trade deficit exceeding $350 billion from 2022 to 2024. Europe is also highly dependent on China for digital goods, leaving it caught between two major technology powers and more exposed to geopolitical risks. The authors recommend strengthening European manufacturing, reducing reliance on Chinese digital goods, and building technology partnerships across public and private sectors. They also plan to update the Digital Dependence Index, which measures reliance on foreign technology such as electronic components, communications equipment, software, operating systems, and patents. The expanded index will cover more than 50 countries, helping reveal digital vulnerabilities and trends worldwide.

• Authors: Johannes Seiler
• Source: Industry.Zero & Transformation
• Publication date: 2026-04-01
• Language: German

Europas digitale Abhängigkeit: Größer als gedacht – und teurer als vermutet

Europe’s digital trade surplus masks significant dependence on foreign technology. Ireland, where many US tech companies manage their European operations, accounted for 87.2% of the EU’s digital-services surplus from 2020 to 2024. Excluding Ireland, the EU had a $350.1 billion deficit in digital goods and services between 2022 and 2024. Europe also relies heavily on China for digital hardware: China accounted for 76% of the EU’s ICT-goods deficit from 2020 to 2023, which reached $143.4 billion in 2024. These dependencies could leave European businesses and governments vulnerable to supply disruptions and geopolitical tensions. The report recommends strengthening European industry, reducing reliance on Chinese digital goods, and developing technology partnerships. An expanded Digital Dependence Index, covering more than 50 countries, is intended to help measure these vulnerabilities.

• Authors: Eva Schmitt
• Source: Chip
• Publication date: 2026-04-01
• Language: German

Die digitale Abhängigkeit bleibt: Aktuelle europäische Strategien funktionieren nicht

Europe’s digital trade surplus is largely driven by US technology companies based in Ireland, which distorts trade statistics and masks the EU’s underlying dependence. Without the “Ireland effect,” the EU would have a digital deficit exceeding $350 billion for 2022–2024, which is nearly 40% of its planned defence spending through 2030. The study also highlights Europe’s reliance on China for digital goods, leaving it caught between two technology powers and more exposed to geopolitical risks. It recommends strengthening European manufacturing and competitiveness, reducing dependence on Chinese imports, and building public-private technology partnerships. The researchers also plan to update and expand the Digital Dependence Index, which measures reliance on foreign technology, from its focus on G20 countries to more than 50 countries worldwide.

• Authors: Heinz Arnold
• Source: Elektroniknet
• Publication date: 2026-03-31
• Language: German

Digital trade trap? A wake-up call for the EU’s Digital Decade

Strong growth in Europe’s digital trade seems to support the EU’s Digital Decade goals, but the underlying data reveal two major vulnerabilities: Ireland’s outsized effect on the EU’s digital trade balance and Europe’s heavy reliance on China in digital goods trade. Together, these imbalances imply that Europe’s “surplus” is effectively a deficit, weakening economic gains, increasing geopolitical risk, and limiting digital autonomy. The brief argues Europe must shift to a more coherent, long-term strategy by coordinating industrial and trade policy, targeting trade partnerships with clear near-term benefits while reducing exposure to China, and using multi-aligned diplomacy that frames autonomy and sovereignty as shared objectives rather than isolation.

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer, Laura Mahrenbach, Rogelio Madrueño, Yen-Chi Lu
• Source: Vodafone Institute and CASSIS/University of Bonn.
• Publication date: 2026-03-30
• Language: English

Digitale Dekade: Ist Europas Tech-Erfolg eine Illusion?

Europe’s apparent digital-trade strength may be misleading. Ireland, where many US tech companies base their European operations, accounted for 87.2% of the EU’s digital-services surplus from 2020 to 2024. Excluding Ireland, the EU recorded a $350.1 billion deficit in digital goods and services over 2022–2024. Europe also depends heavily on China for digital hardware: China accounted for 76% of the EU’s ICT-goods deficit from 2020 to 2023, and that deficit reached $143.4 billion in 2024. The report warns that these dependencies increase economic and geopolitical vulnerability. It recommends strengthening European manufacturing, reducing reliance on Chinese digital goods, and developing technology partnerships. An expanded Digital Dependence Index will compare reliance on foreign technology across more than 50 countries.

• Authors: Viola Heeger
• Source: Tagesspiegel
• Publication date: 2026-03-30
• Language: German

Digital Infrastructure and Sino-African Relations: Chinese ICT Companies and African Agency

Africa’s digital transformation is driven not only by challenges such as the digital divide but also by a young, digitally connected population and rapid innovation in fintech, AI, cloud technologies, and smart systems. Chinese companies play a major role in developing Africa’s digital infrastructure, creating opportunities for technological growth while also raising concerns about dependency and “digital imperialism.” However, African countries retain significant agency by using regulation, negotiation, and growing digital capabilities to pursue their interests and balance relationships with China.

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer, Yen-Chi Lu, Alex Demissie
• Source: Africa-China Relations: Partnership, Peonage or Pawnage? (Ed. Lloyd G. Adu Amoah)
• Publication date: 2026-01-29
• Language: English

Erst handeln, dann verfeinern – im technologiebegeisterten China verbreitet sich KI mit beispielloser Geschwindigkeit

Deepseek and its open source strategy are sparking a major AI shift: its fast, low-cost LLM adoption by China could disrupt global AI competition and even challenge European public administrations. In China, governments and cities are rapidly deploying Deepseek-based “digital staff” for administrative tasks because open code is easier to audit, adapt, and train locally without locking into proprietary providers. The text also flags risks such as hallucinations, skills gaps, energy use, and security and privacy concerns. Overall, it argues China is scaling an open-source ecosystem for governance that Europe must respond to, or risk falling far behind.

Florence Lo / Reuters

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer, Ningjie Zhu
• Source: Neue Zürcher Zeitung
• Publication date: 2025-06-13
• Language: German

Global structures of digital dependence and the rise of technopoles

Digital transformation has created growing global dependencies in hardware, platforms, and patents, raising concerns about increasing technological asymmetries and power concentrations. Using the Digital Dependence Index, the study shows that the US and China have emerged as major “technopoles” with high technological autonomy and the ability to potentially weaponise digital infrastructure and technologies. These findings provide a framework for understanding the relationship between digital dependency, technological autonomy, and the emergence of a new techno-geopolitical world order.

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer, Yen-Chi Lu
• Source: New Political Economy
• Publication date: 2025-05-05
• Language: English

Connectivity and ‘Reglobalization’: India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and its Potential Digital Future

More than a decade after China launched the Belt and Road Initiative, the US, India, Middle Eastern and European countries unveiled IMEC at the G20 in late 2023, sparking debate over whether it is a genuine alternative to BRI. This paper argues that, despite slow progress, IMEC remains a strategic opportunity to help strengthen middle powers and counter US–China bipolarism and fragmentation. It frames IMEC as part of “corridorization,” a new wave of infrastructure-led globalization and “reglobalization” that reshapes supply chains and innovation networks. It also recommends practical steps to expand key ports, add digital and sustainable-energy components, use the corridor for political stabilization and diplomacy, address Egypt’s Suez-related concerns, and accelerate delivery through private-sector involvement and links to European trade interoperability expertise.

• Authors: Gedaliah Afterman, N. Janardhan, Mohammed Baharoon, Maximilian Mayer
• Source: Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy
• Publication date: 2025-04-11
• Language: English

Europa muss digitale Souveränität erlangen: Zeit für eigene Cloud-Infrastruktur

The authors argue Europe must redefine itself after the end of the US-led Western order, placing digital sovereignty at the center alongside security policy. They say France is showing how to do it by investing heavily (e.g., via “French Tech” and AI programs) and promoting tech companies internationally, while Germany has been hesitant but recently made good moves with a decision on technological sovereignty and stronger funding for research, chips, data centers, and skills. They warn Germany is still deeply dependent on US tech and criticize reliance on “European servers” or encryption because US legal access (e.g., Cloud Act) can still enable authorities to reach data. Finally, they call for major investment in European cloud infrastructure, cyber defense, and (if possible) domestic chip production, plus more funding for education and future technologies to speed up innovation.

• Authors: Liane Buchholz, Andreas Schelling
• Source: Frankfurter Allgemeine
• Publication date: 2025-03-26
• Language: German

U.S.-China Digital Fragmentation Is Putting the World in a Bind

Digital fragmentation is accelerating as the U.S., China, and EU adopt increasingly distinct rules for technology, data, AI, and digital platforms. This fragmentation creates regulatory, economic, technological, and security costs for countries around the world, many of which are responding with ad hoc strategies. The most effective response is likely pragmatic resilience—avoiding confrontation, focusing on short-term results, and pursuing long-term regulatory goals.

China News Service photo by Zhang Yuan via AP

• Authors: Laura Mahrenbach, Maximilian Mayer
• Source: World Politics Review
• Publication date: 2025-01-07
• Language: English

From automation to autonomy: Human machine relations in the age of artificial intelligence

This special issue looks at the transition from automation to autonomy in human–machine relations as AI systems become more capable and blur the boundary between machine and human agency. It brings together philosophical, sociological, and technical perspectives to tackle the difficult problem of assigning autonomy to AI—how it affects human freedom, decision-making, and authority.

• Authors: Caja Thimm, Gabriele Gramelsberger, Maximilian Mayer, Frank Piller
• Source: Human-Machine Communication
• Publication date: 2025-01-01
• Language: English

Digital fragmentations, technological sovereignty and new perspectives on the global digital political economy

This special issue examines how “digital sovereignty” interacts with fragmentation in digital ecosystems and internet governance, raising new questions about the global digital political economy. It reviews how increasing national rules, platform power, and technology rivalry can drive “cyber-Balkanization/Splinternet,” and discusses a typology of fragmentation (technical, governmental, and commercial) while arguing that real-world policy and technology links are more complex than neat categories.

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer, Philip J. Nock
• Source: Global Political Economy
• Publication date: 2024-12-09
• Language: English

America v China: who controls Asia’s internet?

The document discusses the escalating competition between America and China over control of Asia's digital infrastructure, particularly data centers and internet connectivity. As China expands its technological footprint in the region, American influence is waning, prompting concerns about data security and espionage. Countries in Asia are navigating this digital landscape, often hedging their bets between the two superpowers while facing increasing cyber threats.

Illustration: Ben Jones

• Source: The Economist
• Publication date: 2024-10-08
• Language: English

Wieso Deutschland in digitaler Abhängigkeit verharrt

Germany is portrayed as far from “digital sovereignty”: key digital technologies and services mostly come from abroad (e.g., the US, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and sometimes India and Israel). The Digital Dependence Index (DDI) places Germany in the weak-to-mid range and suggest little improvement since around 2010. The main issue is not lack of innovation potential, but weak transfer from research to the market due to limited incentives for technology transfer, start-up constraints, little university-industry exchange, and missed opportunities in acquisitions. The conclusion is that Germany must strengthen innovation and better commercialize it to turn one-sided dependency into more balanced, mutual dependence.

• Authors: Haya Schulmann, Michael Waidner
• Source: Frankfurter Allgemeine
• Publication date: 2024-06-27
• Language: German

Deutschlands Unternehmen unzufrieden mit eigener Digital-Abhängigkeit

A Bitkom survey says German companies’ concerns about digital dependency have increased since 2021. 44% of 604 firms say the German government’s efforts to strengthen digital sovereignty are insufficient, and many describe dependencies especially on the USA and also on the EU and China. The biggest concerns are tied to hardware such as semiconductors (75% reporting strong/easier dependencies), as well as AI, 5G components, cloud, and other advanced technologies. The companies argue that politics and firms must act through stronger investment in key technologies and more realistic, scalable strategies, because reducing dependencies quickly is difficult and takes around a decade.

asharkyu/Shutterstock.com

• Authors: Falk Steiner
• Source: heise online
• Publication date: 2024-01-17
• Language: German

Illusionen der Autonomie? Europas Position in den globalen digitalen Abhängigkeitsstrukturen

The analysis examines digital dependence across 37 countries. Although dependence varies widely by sector (software vs. hardware) and by dimensions such as trade, infrastructure, and intellectual property, the overall picture shows a high average level of digital dependence. The results reveal highly asymmetric global structures: the US is far less digitally dependent, while the sharpest asymmetry is in reliance on digital infrastructure; meanwhile, China has reduced its digital dependence over the past decade, but European countries remain highly vulnerable. The findings suggest that common ideas of “digital autonomy” need to be reassessed—within global structures, autonomy for European countries (and most others) remains an illusion.

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer, Yen-Chi Lu
• Source: SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen
• Publication date: 2023-11-30
• Language: German

Il manque en Europe 10 400 milliards d’euros de capitalisation boursière

Europe faces a major shortage of long-term savings and investment capital, which contributes to its dependence on foreign technology, energy, healthcare, and other essential goods and services. The article argues that Europe’s weak financing ecosystem, compared with the United States, has hindered innovation in areas such as digital technology, vaccines, and 5G. It estimates that Europe is missing around €10.4 trillion in stock-market capitalization, highlighting the need for stronger access to long-term capital to improve European innovation and sovereignty.

• Authors: Cécile Philippe
• Source: Institut économique Molinari/ L’Express.
• Publication date: 2023-05-24
• Language: French

Digital Autonomy? Measuring the Global Digital Dependence Structure

Debates about “digital sovereignty” often overlook how deeply major economies already rely on foreign digital technologies shaped by decades of globalization and deregulation. The paper presents the Digital Dependence Index (DDI), which measures dependence across 23 countries. While results differ greatly concerning different sectors (software, hardware, and IP) and dimensions (trade, infrastructure), the overall dependence pattern is a high average level of digital dependence. Some countries became more autonomous (e.g., China, South Korea, Russia, Kenya, US) while others saw dependency rise sharply (notably Japan and Indonesia). The DDI also shows strong asymmetries, with the US the least dependent, especially in infrastructure, while European countries remain highly vulnerable and widen their autonomy gap.

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer, Yen-Chi Lu
• Source: Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies
• Publication date: 2023-04-13
• Language: English

Offener Brief an die Bundesregierung: Digitale Souveränität Deutschlands ist in Gefahr

The BITMi warns that Germany’s digital sovereignty is deteriorating: the promised digital shift is not happening yet, and the country is becoming increasingly vulnerable to US and Chinese technologies. It cites a study using the Digital Dependence Index (DDI), claiming Germany has a high vulnerability, with 82% of demand covered by foreign firms or imported services. In cloud and platform services, the dependence is said to be even stronger, with US control and very high European vulnerability. The association warns this could threaten political self-determination and calls on the government to give digitalization higher priority, strengthen “made in Germany/Europe,” improve access to growth capital, and make digital sovereignty a criterion in public procurement.

Lightspring – shutterstock.com

• Authors: Martin Bayer
• Source: Computerwoche
• Publication date: 2022-12-05
• Language: German

Digitalisierung: Erst abgehängt, dann abhängig

Germany’s promised “digital upturn” has stalled: digital transformation is on low priority, and Germany/Europe are increasingly dependent on US and Chinese technologies, limiting future self-determination. The author cites the Digital Dependence Index to argue that this dependency is measurable and growing, worsened by geopolitical risks like export restrictions. To regain “digital sovereignty,” the author calls for much stronger action than in the digital strategy, especially supporting European digital infrastructure and expanding patenting/IP from across the digital economy, particularly enabling SMEs.

• Authors: Oliver Grün, Maximilian Mayer
• Source: Tagesspiegel
• Publication date: 2022-12-01
• Language: German

IT-Mittelstand warnt vor digitaler Abhängigkeit von China und USA

The BITMi warns that Germany is becoming alarmingly dependent on digital technologies from China and the USA, and says this is a measurable trend, not just a vague perception. Using the Digital Dependence Index, it claims Germany has a high vulnerability: over 80% of companies already feel dependent on non-European technologies, and Germany’s need for digital technologies is covered to about 82% by foreign firms or imported goods and services. The association argues that such dependency threatens political self-determination and could make it “irreversible,” risking Germany’s prosperity if Europe can’t stay globally competitive in digital business models. It calls for the state to prioritize “made in Germany/Europe” and to make digital sovereignty (including compliance with European standards like data protection) a procurement criterion, changing public tendering rules accordingly.

Weitwinkel/Shutterstock.com

• Authors: Stefan Krempl
• Source: heise online
• Publication date: 2022-12-01
• Language: German

Autonomie und Polarisierung. Machttheoretische Perspektiven auf globale digitale Plattformen

The text argues that focusing on autonomy and polarization helps analyze platforms through power. It emphasizes that infrastructures also have an ideological “imaginative” dimension, shaping not just processes but alternative normative visions, and power theories are needed to see platforms as socially constructed. It criticizes Europe’s current autonomy discourse as largely defensive, and calls for new strategic narratives that go beyond geopolitical rivalry and Silicon Valley surveillance capitalism, grounded in conceptual views of platforms.

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer
• Source: Macht und Machtverschiebung: Schlüsselphänomene internationaler Politik – Festschrift für XuewuGu zum 65. Geburtstag (ed. Hendrik W. Ohnesorge)
• Publication date: 2022-10-22
• Language: German

In der digitalen Abhängigkeit

Podcast conversation about the globalization, political autonomy and the issue of digital dependencies with Maximilian Mayer.

• Authors: Martin Wolf, Maximilian Mayer
• Source: Golem
• Publication date: 2022-10-10
• Language: German

Blogreihe Digitale Souveränität

Germany and much of the EU are highly digitally vulnerable compared to the US, China, and South Korea. Both IT companies and non-IT industries should pursue independence to avoid long-term risks. Germany’s digital transformation into a “digital decade” requires long-term financial commitment from the federal government, business, and civil society. The German government must do more than set goals: it should actively strengthen digital sovereignty through concrete measures like the “sovereign workplace,” and by using its purchasing power to prioritize open-source software rather than relying on proprietary foreign solutions.

• Authors: Ann-Kathrin Jekel
• Source: Univention
• Publication date: 2022-09-21
• Language: German

Power in the Age of Datafication: Exploring China’s Global Data Power

The text argues that fears about China’s growing data power are driving competition, but that China’s actual data power is poorly measured and too often assessed in an unsystematic way. It proposes a new framework using Barnett and Duvall’s power taxonomy plus “stack-layer” concepts to distinguish compulsory, institutional, infrastructural, and productive data power. The study finds that China’s data power is more limited than commonly assumed: the state mainly achieves influence through compulsory and institutional means, while infrastructural and productive power remains constrained. Overall, the case shows how different types of power can develop in tension in a datafied world.

• Authors: Ying Huang, Maximilian Mayer
• Source: Journal of Chinese Political Science
• Publication date: 2022-07-28
• Language: English

Digitale Autonomie in der EU "kaum mehr als eine Illusion"

A new study for the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation says Germany and much of the EU are highly dependent on the US and China in digital industries, especially because Germany hasn’t made up ground in recent years. It uses an index to show how vulnerable European countries are. Germany’s score indicates very limited digital self-sufficiency. The authors argue that instead of betting everything on big cloud projects, Europe should reduce dependency step by step through more patent and research investment, using South Korea as a model.

picture alliance/dpa | Christoph Dernbach

• Authors: Till Haase, Martina Schulte
• Source: Deutschlandfunk Nova
• Publication date: 2022-05-04
• Language: German

Europa hat die Konsequenzen seiner digitalen Abhängigkeit noch kaum erkannt

The growing global autonomy gap makes strategic digital policymaking difficult, and Europe is no exception. For now, digital autonomy is little more than an illusion. Germany and Europe cannot realistically claim digital sovereignty over platforms and digital infrastructures. The Digital Dependency Index (DDI) makes the extent of dependence in software, hardware, and ownership rights visible for the first time by mapping this complex area of strategic digital policy. European countries are shown to be highly vulnerable. The findings call for a more comprehensive European digital policy, greater efforts to reduce ICT and IP dependencies.

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer, Yen-Chi Lu
• Source: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
• Publication date: 2022-05-03
• Language: German

调研：实现"数码自主" 德国任重道远

A research report commissioned by the Adenauer Foundation, conducted by researchers at the University of Bonn, argues that Germany and other EU countries are falling behind the U.S., China, and South Korea in the digital economy. Using a “Digital Dependence Index,” the report claims the EU’s digital decade plan and initiatives like Gaia-X may not be enough to give the EU global dominance or true technological autonomy, since Europe shows high foreign dependence in key areas. It also notes that patents related to information and communication technologies are increasingly dominated by U.S., Chinese, and Korean firms. For Germany specifically, the report suggests that instead of demanding full “digital sovereignty,” more realistic policy aims would be to gradually reduce dependence from “highly vulnerable” to “less vulnerable.”

• Authors: dpa
• Source: Deutsche Welle
• Publication date: 2022-05-03
• Language: Chinese

Europäische Digitalwirtschaft fällt weiter zurück

A study by researchers at the University of Bonn finds that Germany and other EU countries are falling further behind the US, China, and South Korea in the digital economy, and that this contradicts the EU Commission’s claims. Using the Digital Dependence Index (DDI), the authors conclude that the US is the only leading economy with relatively low dependence, while China and South Korea score higher and Germany and most EU countries scores signal high vulnerability. The study questions whether big EU projects like GaiaX are the right path and notes growing competition in ICT patents from the US, China, and South Korea. It concludes that “digital sovereignty” as an absolute goal is unrealistic for Germany; a more feasible aim is to reduce dependence from “high vulnerability” to “lower vulnerability.”

• Authors: dpa
• Source: Die Welt
• Publication date: 2022-05-03
• Language: German

Auf dem Weg zur digitalen Selbstbestimmung?

The growing global autonomy gap makes strategic digital policymaking difficult, and Europe is no exception. For now, digital autonomy is little more than an illusion. Germany and Europe cannot realistically claim digital sovereignty over platforms and digital infrastructures. The Digital Dependency Index (DDI) makes the extent of dependence in software, hardware, and ownership rights visible for the first time by mapping this complex area of strategic digital policy.

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer, Yen-Chi Lu
• Source: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
• Publication date: 2022-05-03
• Language: German

Partnerschaftliche Lösungen aus Deutschland für Deutschland

The interviewed experts argue that “digital sovereignty” matters across Europe because many EU states are technologically dependent, so Europe must invest early in future key technologies and maintain strategic autonomy. They also stress that complex digital challenges can’t be solved by one organization alone, so collaboration and ecosystem partnerships are essential.

• Authors: Burghard Lindhorst, Martin Wibbe, Martin Kaloudis
• Source: Hardthöhenkurier
• Publication date: 2022-01-01
• Language: German

Europe’s Digital Autonomy and Potentials of a U.S.-German Alignment toward China

China’s rise as a digital power regarding both maufacturing and innovation, has intensified geostrategic competition, creating a new front in global digital politics. The US and Germany increasingly align on the need for secure digital infrastructure and on boosting digital competitiveness grounded in shared liberal democratic values. Strong transatlantic cooperation is therefore presented as essential for meeting these goals, with the paper laying out the backdrop to digital policy debates in both countries.

Kevin Tao, President of Huawei, Western Europe via Vodafone Institute

• Authors: Maximilian Mayer
• Source: American-German Institute John Hopkins University
• Publication date: 2020-12-16
• Language: English